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ETHICS AND THE ACTIVITY OF PHILOSOPHY IN EARLY WITTGENSTEIN 
OWEN CHANDLER MARKS 
ABSTRACT 
Wittgenstein’s early work is well known for its seminal importance to the philosophy of 
language and logic during the second half of the 20th century and beyond. This thesis will 
explore some of the literature around aspects of his work that are less referenced, though 
equally important: ethics and the nature of the philosophical enterprise. This review of a 
portion of the surrounding literature, along with exegesis of the early texts with these 
particular aspects in mind, will contribute to a broader understanding of Wittgenstein as 
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In closing the Lecture On Ethics, Wittgenstein remarks that, insofar as it may be 
construed as an attempt to speak about absolute good or other similar things, ethics 
cannot contribute to our body of knowledge in the same manner as the natural sciences. 
This assertion is found in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as well as in the private 
writings leading up to the publication of that text. It is, in ways both subtle and direct, 
maintained in the work that follows the philosopher for the rest of his life and beyond. In 
these texts, ethics is placed beyond the immediate sphere of sense and calculation. Yet, in 
all of this, Wittgenstein insists that ethics “is a document of a tendency in the human 
mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life 
ridicule it.” (LOE, p12) 
Unraveling Wittgenstein’s own stance on ethics, value and the good life, this 
thesis offers an exploration of a few of the possible positions that he could hold given 
what he states in his early corpus. By navigating these, as well as coming to understand 
how his own activity of philosophizing relates to them, a more complete picture on this 
already complex and thoroughly-discussed topic may be attained. Furthermore, the 
deeply personal ideas on the activity of philosophy when applied to ethics that 
Wittgenstein maintains are compelling in their own right, and are worth investigating. 
The initial emphasis of this thesis will entail a general overview of the 
philosophical project that Wittgenstein embarks on in the TLP. This will provide enough 
context for the subsequent exploration, for which his NB and the LOE will provide 
further direct insight into his thoughts and process. Parts II and III of the work will 
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examine his specific insights into the nature of philosophy as an activity and the sphere 
and makeup of ethics, respectively. The last part will include some possible problems 
with the views maintained throughout the work, most of which have developed out of the 
Wittgenstein scholarship over the last several decades. 
Part I Key Features of the Tractatus 
  It is in her introductory pairing to the TLP that Elizabeth Anscombe clearly states 
the goal of the that text: “…the principle theme of the book is the connection between 
language, or thought, and reality.” (Anscombe, 1971, pp.19) While this is undoubtedly 
true in the strictest sense of what the largest portion of the book tries to convey – the 
work up to and the description of the picture theory of representation and the general 
form of the proposition – it must also be the case that the book, if not expressing a body 
of ethical doctrine, at the very least concerns itself with the nature of ethics. In fact, it 
may even be the case that those former elements of the book are used to bolster the 
ethical project. Often quoted is Wittgenstein’s own assertion of the import of his ethical 
project in a letter to prospective publisher Ludwig von Flicker: 
“It isn’t really foreign to you, because the book’s point is ethical...My 
work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not 
written.  And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. For 
the ethical gets its limit drawn from the inside, as it were, by my book.” 
(Diamond, 2000, pp.152)1 
 
 Part I of this thesis will then be an attempt to present these two aspects of the text, 
what is written clearly and what is shown through the structure and sentiment of the text, 
																																																						
1 Quoted from Cora Diamond’s Ethics, Imagination, and the Tractatus, as found in The 
New Wittgenstein, 2000 (ed. Crary and Read), this is from a letter to Ludwig von Flicker, 
itself presented in B.F. McGuinness’ Wittgenstein, Prototractatus, London, 1971 
		 3	
in a brief exploration of parts the TLP. Particular attention will be paid to those aspects of 
the text that pertain directly to the ethics and the activity of philosophy. However, in 
examining the dueling pair proposed by Wittgenstein himself - the difference between 
what is written and what is shown by the text - ample evidence for the exploration in Part 
IV of this thesis is also found. Grounds for multiple conflicting views on the text will be 
explored in this brief summary, hopefully providing enough elucidation to get a clearer 
feeling for the thoughts on ethics offered in the TLP.  
I.I The Beginning and the End of the TLP 
 
 Cora Diamond speaks of the frame of the TLP, and close attention to this element 
of the text’s structure is particularly useful when trying to discern which parts of the book 
contribute to Wittgenstein’s ethical project. In her essay Ethics, Imagination, and the 
Method of the Tractatus, Diamond argues that the philosopher’s “intention is not that the 
book should teach us things we did not know… In what we might call the frame of the 
book – its Preface and its closing sentences – Wittgenstein combines remarks about the 
aim of the book and the kind of reading it requires.” (Diamond, 2000, pp.149) The 
beginning and the end of the text act as posts, between which runs a consistent strand of 
the author’s thought. By looking at each side as whole working towards some particular 
philosophical or literary aim, this through-line becomes much clearer.  
 That the TLP does not purport to offer a body of knowledge in the traditional 
sense is obvious from the opening of the text. Wittgenstein’s prefacing remark that the 
book “is not a textbook” (Wittgenstein, 2007, pp.27) is based on the explicit statement 
that, to understand what he is trying to convey, the reader must already have some sort of 
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prior understanding. What is less clear is what the TLP does offer. The question of the 
purpose of the book is one of the more contentious topics in the literature that it spawned 
and has great implications for Wittgenstein’s ethical project and his conception of the 
activity of philosophy. The frame of the text offers vital insight in this search. 
 Wittgenstein follows up his remark on understanding the book with plans for its 
purpose. He aims for the book to “draw a limit to thinking, or rather – not to thinking, but 
to the expression of thoughts.” (TLP, pp.27) This comment introduces what at first 
approach appears to be a dichotomy that runs the length of the text. Yet, such an account 
is misleading. As the author famously notes, devising a limit to thinking would require an 
exit from thinking itself; an ability to regard thinking externally. This is a non-starter for 
Wittgenstein. So, the limit to the expression of thoughts is to be drawn from within 
expression itself. At the edge of the inner expanse will rest the various limits that 
Wittgenstein establishes. To say that something is outside the realm of expression, that it 
is nonsense, cannot place it in some totally other sphere. To recognize such a thing as 
outside of the sphere of thought would require an exodus from that sphere itself. The 
limits of the sphere, then, are the ultimate extent of the world, not quite within, as is the 
case with facts, yet not wholly without.  
 This opening account of the limits of expression, the world, and thought, force a 
comparison with Wittgenstein’s own remark to von Flicker.  Ethics too must be drawn 
from the inside, using whatever is tangible enough to get a firm hold. This places it not in 
the world of the expressible, but at its limit. The book, in a way, presents that which can 
be presented: an exploration of language and facts of the world. Yet, from the outset, 
		 5	
Wittgenstein makes plain his concern with the limits we encounter through such an 
exploration. Being that ethics must be drawn like other limits, it must be that, at least in 
part, his concern extends to that topic in a similar fashion to his concern with language.  
 The closing of the TLP returns the reader to the same considerations as the 
preface, though it retains the idiosyncratic form that Wittgenstein adopts in the first 
proposition. This second half of the frame brings us back to the concern for the limit and 
back to a consideration of the ethical, though here it is explicit. It is here, too, that 
Wittgenstein once again asserts a purpose, or perhaps an outcome, of the text.  
At 6.421 Wittgenstein asserts that, along with logic, “ethics is transcendental.” 
(TLP, 6.421) So too, aesthetics.  As Anscombe rightly shows, when speaking of the 
transcendental at this point, Wittgenstein “does not mean that the propositions of logic 
state transcendental truths; it means that they, like all other propositions, shew something 
that pervades everything sayable and is itself unsayable.” (Anscombe, 1971, pp.166) 
Parts II and III will return to this exceedingly insightful point, but here it is important to 
mark it simply for its importance to the text. Wittgenstein is demarcating the 
transcendental limits of the world from within. Transcendental, here, should be taken a 
pervasive element of the world that is, at the same time, not attached to a fact of the 
world.  It does not possess the sense of a true proposition and therefore is beyond 
empirical knowledge and the scope of senseful discourse. While Anscombe’s remark is 
explicitly aimed at logic showing forth from stated propositions, the continued parallel 
between logic and ethics, as limits and as transcendental, forces ethics to take up many of 
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the same attributes as logic. Ethics, like logic, is shown as a pervading element in the 
fabric of the world.  
 The main thrust of Diamond’s essay and an essential element to Part II of this 
exploration, involves figuring out how the reader is to go about understanding both the 
text and the author. This particular investigation is best begun through the frame of the 
text, and it is worth noting when discussing the structure of the TLP. While observations 
of this kind certainly endow the reader with a kind of appreciation of the literary prowess 
of the author, one step further in the investigation shows that such an understanding of 
this part of the text’s architecture further contributes to grasping the author’s idea itself.  
Wittgenstein begins the text with the assertion mentioned above, that “this book 
will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the 
thoughts which are expressed in it –or similar thoughts.” (TLP, pp.27) He closes the book 
with a return to what it means to understand, that his “propositions are elucidatory in this 
way: he who understands [Wittgenstein] finally recognizes them as senseless…” (TLP, 
6.54) This returns us to Diamond’s essay:  
“We cannot see how we are supposed to read the remarks on ethics in the 
Tractatus without seeing how Wittgenstein thought of its philosophical 
method, and crucial to that is his conception of what it is to understand a 
person who utters nonsense.” (Diamond, 2000, pp. 156) 
 
 For a book that, as we shall see, most concerns itself with the nature of language 
and its attempts to express nonsense, the author himself expresses quite a bit. There is 
something important then, as expressed through the frame of the text, about trying to 
understand someone who is speaking nonsense. This is central to the book and to 
understanding Wittgenstein’s ethical project.  
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The final section of the text contains remarks that we will return to in both Part II 
and Part III. The psychology around and nature of death, the purpose of philosophy 
compared to the empirical sciences, and the world considered as a contained whole, all 
contribute to the discussion of ethics in Wittgenstein’s early work. For such a brief 
summary of the text, however, it is best if they are acknowledged as a part of the frame 
built into the preface and closing remarks; a frame that binds an exploration of what can 
be grasped, analyzed, and used to show the limits of the world.  
I.II The Picture Theory of Representation in the TLP 
 
 The frame of the TLP binds together what may very well be some of the most 
influential ideas of the 20th century. Here I present a brief summary of a central part of the 
text, once again attending to those sections and remarks which pertain most directly to 
the goals of this work. Sifting in this fashion is misleading, however, for as was explored 
through the frame of the text, the ideas involving ethics and the nature of philosophy 
permeate the entirety of the TLP. While many of the key sections explored do not 
contribute to Wittgenstein’s ethical project in an obvious way, they do so through a 
parallelism that is found throughout the text. The sections here are most obviously 
concerned with language and logic, yet this relationship, if the parallelism with ethics and 
aesthetics is accepted, has profound implications for this investigation. 
 Wittgenstein begins the explanation of his picture theory of representation in his 
standard, straightforward manner: “we make ourselves pictures of facts.” (TLP, 2.1) 
There are a few elements to unpack in the explanation given around his proposal. One is 
Wittgenstein’s use and placement of reality and world. As the author states immediately 
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prior to the theory, the world is the totality of existing atomic facts (TLP, 2.04) Compare 
this to reality, which is both the existence and non-existence of atomic facts. (TLP, 2.06) 
Wittgenstein will go on to say that the pictures we form are attempting to grasp, or reach 
up to, reality (TLP, 2.1511)  
A picture’s success on this graded comparison to reality, or maybe better put as its 
accuracy, is found in what is correctly grasped by the picture’s depiction of the world as 
it is, both in the presence and absence of possibly extent facts. Thus is the description 
senseful; it accurately depicts what is and is not the case and thus rightly pictures a 
possible state of the world. Holding the picture up to reality reveals whether it is “right or 
wrong; true or false,” (TLP, 2.21) as Wittgenstein would put it.  
There is something peculiar about the sense in which Wittgenstein is orchestrating 
the concepts of reality and world. By grasping what is senseful, pictures depict more or 
less of what parts of reality manifest in the world. When rightly constructed, these 
pictures are “the feelers…with which the picture touches reality.” (TLP, 2.1515) Yet, the 
full picture, when taken as a though -the logical picture- depicts not reality, but the world. 
(TLP, 3.01). Reality is always placed at arm’s length, appearing closer or further based on 
the scope and rightness of the picture. Yet, even the full picture of the world - the totality 
of everything that is the case - fails to completely grasp reality. This is in line with the 
opening remarks that appear in the frame of the text. To fully picture reality, the 
construction would have to be made from the outside. As this is impossible, aspects of 
reality show through from what is depicted in the senseful pictures of the world. What 
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shows through is the logical form. Logic, as a limit, shows through as something more 
real or more a part of reality as such than the facts of the world.  
Adopting the parallelism of logic and ethics creates some interesting 
interpretations of the picture theory. Ethics is also found at the limit of the world. Like 
logic, it is transcendental. Though it does not show through pictures of the world exactly 
as logical form, perhaps there is some other way that it reveals itself. Does any of this 
mean that Wittgenstein has committed himself to some sort of realism regarding ethics 
and values? While this will be addressed chiefly in Part III of this investigation, for now, 
at the very least, it seems that he would have a hard time avoiding that interpretation. 
While there is certainly something to be said about the existence or non-existence facts of 
the world, the type of existence that he alludes to when discussing reality goes much 
deeper. If the parallelism between logic and ethics holds through the picture theory of 
representation, Wittgenstein must adopt some shade of realism in regards to ethics. I will 
argue on behalf of this position in Part III, but it is palpable enough here to point out and 
question. 
 Modality is also important to the picture theory, and its presence there further 
reflects the parallelism between ethics, logic and language. As reckoned before, the 
pictures we make are possible states of the world. We then hold them up against it in 
order to see if they correspond truthfully. This idea of possibility radiates throughout the 
text. Possible states of affairs, the comparison with what is necessary, possible and 
impossible, all have parts to play in a discussion of logic.  
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Wittgenstein’s most important comment on modality in the TLP is that there is 
only logical necessity and logical impossibility. (TLP, 6.375) Possible states of the world 
are only that. Facts are so in that they are possible. Should they be necessary, they would 
be tautologies; impossibilities are contradictions. Facts of the world are presented in a 
way so that they may or may not be the case. Even though the total of extent facts is in its 
current arrangement, there is nothing preventing it from being otherwise.  
These considerations of modality do a tremendous amount of work for 
Wittgenstein’s ethical project, though not in a way that is immediately obvious. They are 
best taken with his consideration of solipsism and the comments on ethics in the end of 
the TLP, but a few pertinent questions surface in these simple observations. What would 
it be like for moral values to be otherwise? If ethical and moral facts were extant, then 
there would be the possibility that they could not be, should everything that is the case 
shift in truth-value. This question is consistent with the picture theory, and provides the 
ground for Wittgenstein’s later assertion of ethics as a transcendental and beyond fact. 
 A similar situation to that orchestrated above appears in the following: should 
logic be a part of the world, what would it be like for it to be otherwise? What would it be 
like for logic to be other than what is shown to us presently? Wittgenstein answers this 
directly in his formulation of the picture theory. At 3.031 he remarks that, “it used to be 
said that God could create everything, except what was contrary to the laws of logic. The 
truth is, we could not say of an unlogical world how it would look.” (TLP, 3.031) That 
the picture we make fails to grasp a logic different from that which shows itself is reliant 
on logic being necessary. If the parallelism between logic and ethics continues to hold, 
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then the necessity of ethics is also introduced into the mix. At the very least, ethics is not 
to be viewed as contingent in the same manner as the facts of life.  
I.III Final Remarks  
 
 I have remarked on a few structural aspects and ideas of the TLP in order to 
facilitate further comparison between the logical and the ethical. Though the bulk of the 
text is explicitly concerned with the former, the parallelism between the two is evident 
and carries implications that will be explored in Part III. 
 Questioning the parallelism described in the second part of the summary is apt. 
However, here I think that enough direct evidence can be mustered to show that logic and 
ethics are alike in several ways: they are both limits to the world, transcendental, and not 
subjected to the same considerations of possibility as facts of the world. Building on that 
parallel is crucial for any exploration of ethics in Wittgenstein’s early work and, at the 
very least, shows that he takes his work seriously when he considers it to be a work on 
ethics.  
Part II The Activity of Philosophy 
 
 The second entry of Wittgenstein’s wartime notebooks asks the question bluntly: 
“…what is the task of philosophy?” (Wittgenstein, 1979, trans. Anscombe, 3.9.14) While 
this remark follows a long attempt to figure out how it is that “logic must take care of 
itself” (Wittgenstein, 1979, 22.8.14) it reveals a task which remains at the heart of the 
philosopher’s work throughout his life. Wittgenstein’s philosophical activity is bound to 
understanding the nature of that enterprise. 
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 Much of the TLP, too, concerns itself with identifying those particular things 
which are essential to the activity of philosophy. Wittgenstein even lists them off in his 
effort to delineate the empirical sciences from a philosophical action. Yet, as mentioned 
in examination of the frame of the text, his own account of the nature of philosophy is 
somewhat at odds with what he is engaged in. As he urges the reader at the end of the 
TLP, the true way of philosophizing would be “to say nothing except what can be said, 
i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e., something that has nothing to do with 
philosophy.” (TLP, 6.53) This is quite obviously not the activity that he has engaged in 
for the entirety of the text.  
Understanding the nature of the activity of philosophy is integral to understanding 
the nature of Wittgenstein’s work. Not only does he concern himself with exploring this 
topic throughout his life, but it is a process that he actively engages with during his own 
investigations. To examine both how he views philosophy and how he conducts 
philosophically will provide insight later on when looking to his ethical project and will 
further clarify some of his early work.  
II.I Philosophy and Language 
 Language and philosophy are inextricably linked throughout the early and later 
periods of Wittgenstein’s writings. As first expressed in this exploration through 
Anscombe’s words, yet also for all who have come across the texts, the relation between 
language and reality is at the core of the author’s project. While there are many ways in 
which this connection may be perceived, the way that best suits an exploration is to sort 
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out Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the distinction between what is said and what is shown 
through language.  
 The saying and showing distinction cuts deep into what is gleaned from senseful 
language through the activity of philosophy as well as into the nature of Wittgenstein’s 
ethical project. In his essay, “Saying and Showing” (1976), Peter Geach remarks that this 
distinction may be the most difficult to grasp of all of the aspects of the TLP. He states 
the basic distinction well in that essay. While what can be said can be said clearly, as 
Wittgenstein asserts, “various features of reality come out, sich ziegen, in our language, 
but we cannot use language to say, to assert, that reality has these features…” (Geach, 
1976, pp.54) The failure of language to fully grasp what the speaker often wishes to 
assert about reality, whether it some deeper knowledge of logic, ethics, or aesthetics, is 
shown following the elucidatory actions of applied philosophy. This failure illustrates 
that the propositions concerned with such transcendental aspects, though they seek 
comparison with reality like all linguistic expression, cannot be described as propositions 
truly for they do not grasp the facts of the world. The showing, as put by this 
interpretation of Wittgenstein, would then allow for some discernment of those more 
general features of reality as observed at the limits of possible expression, though not 
themselves expressed.  
 Geach sees the distinction as being born from one in Frege’s work, specifically of 
the distinction between function and object, which greatly influenced Wittgenstein. Cora 
Diamond further elucidates Geach’s work in a chapter of her text The Realistic Spirit 
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(1995), and there is much there that contributes to an understanding of ethics and the 
activity of philosophy.  
 Wittgenstein’s continued reference to a reality that shows forth from senseful 
language presents an issue when trying to reconcile the idea the text expounds and the 
activity with which the author is himself engaged. Diamond finds the problem to be most 
pronounced at the closing of the TLP, when Wittgenstein explicitly states where a reader 
should find themselves after finishing the text. She notes that Wittgenstein observes that 
one thing that shows itself through language is the logical form of reality: “so it looks as 
if there is this whatever-it-is, the logical form of reality, some essential feature of reality, 
which reality has all right, but which we cannot say or think that it has.” (Diamond, 1995, 
pp.181)  
 Diamond argues that continuing to point towards the inexpressible aspects of 
reality as discussed above, assuming that such elements represent some true reality that 
cannot be reached through language, is avoiding the project with which Wittgenstein 
concerns himself. She claims that the attempt of language to grasp the inaccessible has its 
own use, which is realized throughout the TLP and is made manifest with the final 
throwing away of the ladder. Yet, once such language has been used to show just what it 
is incapable of reaching, “it is in the end to be let go of and honestly taken to be real 
nonsense, plain nonsense, which we are not in the end to think of as corresponding to an 
ineffable truth.” (Diamond, 1995, p.181)  
The use of language is then integral to discovering just how language cannot be 
used. Thus, Wittgenstein’s early writings, though ultimately recognized as nonsense, are 
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essential for coming to see the world rightly. Using the nonsense of his philosophical 
propositions as a ladder, the reader is capable of seeing the outlines of what cannot be 
spoken of sensefully. The linguistic failure of philosophy, when used rightly, becomes 
the ultimate illustrative tool for the philosopher.  
II.II Philosophy and Science 
 
 The delineation of philosophy and the natural sciences is clear in the midst of the 
TLP. The first split arrives early in the fourth section of the text. Wittgenstein states that 
“the totality of true propositions is the total natural science” (TLP, 4.11) and, a moment 
later, that “philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word “philosophy” must 
mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences).” 
(TLP, 4.112) Science and philosophy, while not at necessarily at odds, are divided in that 
they are by nature aimed towards different concerns.  
 The division between science and philosophy is built on several clear distinctions 
between the two, both in terms of their goals and in the subjects which they oversee. 
Wittgenstein goes on to list these to some extent. Chief among them, and one which 
returns to the importance that the philosopher places on limits in the explanation of the 
frame of the text in Part I, is that “philosophy limits the disputable sphere of natural 
science.” (TLP, 4.112) The natural sciences exercise some explanatory power when 
considering the facts of the world. This is, essentially, not the purpose nor the ability of 
the activity of philosophy as proposed in the early Wittgenstein. “The object of 
philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.” (TLP, 4.112) Science, contrariwise, 
involves making senseful claims about the arrangement of facts, i.e. something that can 
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be said and make sense. Philosophy, as the limiting activity of science, seeks to ensure 
that science does not transgress beyond these accurate propositions. It is this process of 
clarification and of elucidation that the empirical sciences require if they are to remain 
senseful. 
 While philosophy’s limit to the sciences manifests itself as metaphysics, 
epistemology comes forth as the limit to human psychology. Psychology, like natural 
sciences, is a part from philosophy in that it presents a body of knowledge concerning 
facts of the world: thoughts and emotions. Wittgenstein does not abstract such things into 
a world separate from that of hard facts about ferns, chairs, and rocks. So, too, go thought 
processes. Wittgenstein comments that these, when they were considered to be a part of 
logic, led philosophers to great confusion as they set to include them in process of 
epistemology. By setting philosophy up as an activity, rather than a theory or body of 
knowledge, Wittgenstein hopes to avoid such confusion.  
 Attempts to reconcile the separation of philosophy and science with the closing 
remarks of the TLP result in much of the confusion that exists between logical positivists 
and later interpreters of the early works. Though it is true that Wittgenstein himself states 
that the correct way of philosophizing would be to convey only statements of natural 
science, he cautions against zealous reliance on their explanatory power. Further, it is 
important to note once again that this statement is at odds with the activity that he 
engages in. The capability of language to grasp the facts of the world does not serve as a 
way of demoting or exiling things that cannot be expressed. Wittgenstein approaches this 
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flaw in adherents of science by comparing them to the ancients. In the modern 
worldview, he states:  
“People stop short at natural laws as something unassailable, as they did the 
ancients at God and Fate…But the ancients were clearer, in so far as they 
recognized one clear terminus, whereas the modern system makes it appear 
as though everything were explained.” (TLP, 6.372) 
 
 Philosophy, then, is once again the limit to the sciences. Yet, this limit is a 
protective measure for the scientist, in a similar way to the therapies of the philosopher. 
Belief that the sciences offers knowledge of everything implies that one would be able to 
bring empirical methods outside of the limits of the world, to look upon the whole from 
without. This, as already discussed, is not possible. The triumph of the ancients is their 
understanding that there is a point beyond which understanding cannot go. The scientist 
who wishes to account for everything falls into a similar trap as the philosopher. 
Philosophy, properly done, is both the use of and understanding the limits of senseful 
propositions.  
II.III Philosophy and Therapy 
 
 The conception of philosophy as a form of therapy is more conspicuous in 
Wittgenstein’s later work, but there is still a palpable extension of the notion to the early 
period. There are two core ways that philosophy manifests itself under the guise of 
therapy; one rises to eliminate the problems of the metaphysician and the other to 
dissolve broader human problems of the meaning of life and the attainment of happiness. 
The latter more directly involves this work’s concern with the author’s ethical project, 
though the two modes of therapy mirror each other in a way that is best explored in this 
examination of the Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the activity of philosophy.  
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“Most propositions and questions, that have been written about 
philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot, therefore, 
answer the questions of this kind at all, but only state their 
senselessness…And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems 
are really no problems.” (TLP, 4.003) 
 
 Thus is stated the core concern of the text’s involvement with the therapy of the 
philosopher and the metaphysician. Essentially linked with the above discussion of 
philosophy and language, Wittgenstein picks up a problem here that is carried on 
throughout his work. The problems of philosophical discourse are born out of the 
confusions spawned from the improper use and understanding of language. 
 It is not that the assertions of the philosopher are false, as Wittgenstein claims, but 
senseless. They do not map to the facts of the world as their propositions and pictures 
would have them. The problems of philosophy arise because the job the metaphysician 
sets out to perform cannot be completed with the tools and materials at hand. In perhaps 
the truest sense imaginable, it is a case of reach exceeding grasp, though here without the 
positive outcomes that that action might bring. Confusion and inability brings with it 
dissatisfaction, and thus the philosopher is unable to happily conduct their exercise.  
There is similar criticism of philosophy in the NB, though it takes to task 
explicitly the kind of philosophical skepticism that leads to the sorts of confusions 
described in the TLP. It is here Wittgenstein states that “it is one of the chief skills of the 
philosopher to occupy himself with questions which do not concern him.” (NB, 1.5.15) It 
is Wittgenstein’s argument that the problem with such questions is that they are asked of 
things which cannot possibly exist in the world, are not facts, and therefore cannot be 
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spoken of. Such questions themselves cannot exist as “a question can only exist where an 
answer exists.” (NB, 1.5.15) 
The therapy of the philosopher mirrors that of those who ask questions of value 
and the meaning of life; ethical questions. The result, however, differs in that it resolves 
into a different kind of satisfaction. Rather than clearing up the confusions of presumed 
knowledge of non-fact facts, resulting in a deeper epistemological understanding for the 
philosopher, therapies aimed towards ethical disquiet result in a peace of a different kind. 
Though the specifics and importance of that ideal state are addressed in Part III of this 
essay, the mechanic of the activity philosophy involved is set down here.  
The second therapy begins to mirror the first with Wittgenstein’s assertion that 
“all propositions are of equal value,” (TLP, 6.4) and, therefore, “there can be no ethical 
propositions.” (TLP, 6.42) This realization is similar to the first form of therapy in that it 
pulls ethics out of the realm of propositions and, therefore the world of facts. This 
obviously does not distinguish the longing for value, but presents a starting point be 
separating it from the senseful and what is ultimately subjected to the sciences.  
On first pass, this newly found reality of ethics presents one immediate form of 
therapy. If ethics is taken out of the realm of the sensible, it is not subjected to 
vicissitudes of nature. By that I mean it is not a part of the realm of the possible and the 
contingent. It makes ethics, in a way, necessary. This returns us to the idea expressed at 
the end of the account of the picture theory of representation. Ethics, not accessible 
through propositions and not a part of the world of facts, could not be otherwise. 
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Wittgenstein hammers this home with the thought that, “the solution of the riddle of life 
in space and time lies outside space and time.” (TLP, 6.4312) 
When questioning the meaning of life, the mechanism for resolving the problem 
is similar to that used against questions of a metaphysical sort. The issue is one of a 
confused attempt to grasp the limit of reality in the same way as one grasps the facts of 
the world, with language. As the answer of addressing this limit of reality could only be 
voiced by stepping beyond the limit, the answer cannot be expressed. And, as 
Wittgenstein states, “for an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be 
expressed.” (TLP, 6.5) Ultimately, this realization leads to the philosopher’s ultimate 
statement on the matter, that “The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing 
of the problem.” (TLP, 6.521) The use of philosophy to reveal that a confusion about the 
possibilities of language allows for unanswerable questions to be posed shows us that 
such questions need not arise in the first place. 
The above reading of the TLP contributes to certain interpretations that regard 
Wittgenstein to be asserting philosophy as a form of therapy, in that it dispels confusion 
and leads to quietude. This is something that mirrors Spinoza and his latter portion of the 
Ethics in some respects, though Wittgenstein is concerned here more with the confusions 
that arise from the use of language. Denying that, at the very least, philosophy dispels 
confusion seems impossible. To deny that it is a form of therapy, then, may rest on one’s 
conception of that activity. In Wittgenstein, however, as will be discussed more in Part 
III, this therapy does lead to better life, as the confusion and subsequent fear derived from 
the failed usage of language and confusion of understanding of reality disappears. 
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II.IV Final Remarks 
 
 Wittgenstein’s philosophy is an activity that is performed, not a set of doctrines to 
be learned. There are, however, certain attitudes that may be gained by undertaking the 
activity in its correct form. Right understanding of the possibilities of language, the 
resolution of the problems that emerge following such confusion, and the subsequent 
peace of mind are the end goals of such an exercise.  
 The separation of philosophy and science is of paramount importance for this end 
state of philosophy. Science, also, does not answer the questions that philosophers ask in 
their attempt to reach outside of the world. Wittgenstein states this much plainly: 
“We feel that even if all possible scientific questions were answered, the 
problems of life have still not been touch at all. Of course there is then no 
question left, and just this is the answer.” (TLP, 6.52) 
 
Conceptualizing philosophy in this early portion of Wittgenstein’s work shows it 
as an activity bent on recognizing limits by what is shown in the world; both the limits of 
what language grasps provides a glimpse of the limits of reality. Yet, an attempt to 
transgress beyond these limits results in an empty answer. Philosophy, by adhering to 
what can be put sensefully, shows what cannot be put so. 
Wittgenstein’s remarks at the end of the text show that such a process as 
philosophy may not leave the philosopher satisfied in their role as philosopher: “this 
method would be unsatisfying to [the metaphysician] – he would not have the feeling that 
we were teaching him philosophy – but it would be the only strictly correct method.” 
(TLP, 6.53) The philosopher is left unfulfilled because they adhere to the possibility that 
such answers from the perspective of full-view of reality exist. Yet, once the activity of 
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philosophy is carried out, such a view is shown to be impossible. For those who pose the 
riddle of life, such an exercise frees them from its illusory appeal. Thus the questions of 
life and philosophy disappear.  
Part III Ethical Arguments in the Early Wittgenstein 
The ethical project upon which Wittgenstein embarks is not typical. As shown 
above, it relies on the use of language and logic to articulate properly and is often about 
the nature of ethics itself. This has largely been examined in the thoughts on how 
philosopher may demarcate certain limits or realms of the ethical, as well as other 
transcendental limits. 
Here I present two arguments that stretch a little further beyond the nature of 
ethics as such and into more substantive ethical positions. The primary purpose of this, as 
the rest of the paper, is to pin Wittgenstein as a certain kind of ethical thinker, rather than 
either a pure sort of positivist or a presenter of only skeptical arguments. To that end, I 
have sketched out one argument which may find Wittgenstein held up as a part of a 
tradition of moral realism – though of a particular stripe – and one which pulls on an 
Epicurean strand of thought which underlies the entirety of the early period. 
These views are not comprehensive and, as Cora Diamond notes in her work, 
many authors have interpreted Wittgenstein in a way that corresponds to their own ethical 
positions. As such, I have only grabbed two strands for which I think there is good 
evidence.  
III.I From Aesthetics to Realism 
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 Hinted in parts of this paper has been an argument that the early Wittgenstein 
corpus expresses a certain shade of realism when approaching ethics. I will here muster 
some evidence and an interpretation to support such a claim. Though Wittgenstein’s 
version of the argument is refined between the NB and the TLP, and further so into the 
LOE, there is enough consistency to find purchase for the idea that the texts present an 
approach to a sort of moral realism, though one that does not entirely conform to more 
common conceptions of such a theory. 
The most obvious starting point for the argument to moral realism may be 
Wittgenstein’s comments on solipsism late in the TLP. The section between 5.61 and 5.641 
deal with this issue, though that last proposition states the thought explicitly: 
“Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. 
The I in solipsism shrinks to an extentionless point and there remains the 
reality coordinated with it.” (TLP, 5.641) 
 
 The “I” referred to in this passage is not the “I” of psychology, manifested as a 
kind of mind or will. Once that manifestation is placed in the world, it is yet another 
observable entity which can be spoken of with some sense. The “I” as Anscombe rightly 
puts it, is not used to refer to any one particular thing, but to “the centre of life, or the 
point from which everything is seen.” (Anscombe, p. 168) It is from this transcendental 
“I”, the transcendental subject, that the world is viewed in its entirety. An “I”, a mind, a 
will, are all examined in front of this expansive consciousness, couched in its perception 
from the outset of observation. 
 Stanley Cavell’s essay, “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy” (2002), picks 
up this idea of the transcendental subject and shows how it directly relates to Kant and 
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the Critique of Judgment. “Kant begins by saying that aesthetic judgment is not 
‘theoretical,’ not ‘logical,’ not ‘objective,’” he states, but “one ‘whose determining 
ground can be no other than subjective.’”(Cavell, Aesthetic Problems of Modern 
Philosophy, p.88)2 The subject is the starting point of aesthetic judgment, and if 
Wittgenstein’s use of the subject provides any guidance, the aesthetic judgment will have 
expansive and profound effect on the world.  
 Wittgenstein separates types of value judgments in a similar fashion to Kant’s 
dichotomy of aesthetic judgment. While Kant begins with an account of taste, 
Wittgenstein, in the LOE, accounts for value in an immediate or more utilitarian sense. 
Both are accounts of judgments relative to particular facts. For Kant, taste is a relative 
judgment, accounting only for a particular subject’s belief or desire. Wittgenstein’s 
account of a chair being called a “good” chair, is to describe value relative to a particular 
end.3 This is not what he or anyone hopes to get at when discussing ethics, much in the 
same way that Kant is not content with adhering to mere taste. 
 Cavell’s explanation of Kant transfers to the second sort of aesthetic judgement: 
that concerning beauty. The subject, in this account, demands the universal truth of their 
judgement, and “[they] go on claiming this agreement even though [they] know from 
experience that they will not receive it.” (Cavell, p.89) A subject speaking with the 
universal voice demands adherence to their revelation; “don’t you see?”, they cry. 





of spectral chimera4, would still maintain the universal assertion as being utterly real for 
the transcendental subject. And that it why it fills the world, the makeup of the fabric of 
reality much like logic. The cry of the subject, given the account of solipsism, becomes 
real. Much as Cavell says when discussing the therapies that Wittgenstein is accounting 
for, “believing it is seeing it.” (Cavell, p.86) 
 The certain inexpressibility of this realist ethics is strange when compared to the 
expression of facts of the world shown through the picture theory of representation. 
Those nodes of reality are perfectly capable of being grasped by language. This failure 
parallels the kind of therapies that Wittgenstein prescribes for the wayward philosopher. 
Cavell accounts for these, though a bridge can be stretched to the account of ethics as 
well, rather than for philosophical questions in general. “The more one learns, so to speak 
the hang of oneself,” he states: 
“The less one is able to say what one has learned; not because you have 
forgotten what it was, but because nothing you said would seem like an 
answer or a solution…You have reached a conviction, but not about a 
proposition...You are different, what you recognize as problems are 
different, your world is different.” (Cavell, p.86) 
 
 The reality of ethics is similar to the quietism of the philosopher’s therapy. 
It is an answer, in a way, but not one which could be voiced. It is an insight, but 
not into knowledge. Wittgenstein questions this phenomenon at the end of the 
TLP: “Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of 
life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted?” (TLP, 6.521) 




permeating fabric of the world, and its contemplation is that which gives rise to 
moral conviction, rightness, and understanding. The showing of this ethics reveals 
reality in the expressible, and this is how it should be taken as a kind of realism. It 
may be termed mystical in some way, but that doesn’t undermine its truth to the 
transcendental subject.   
III.II An Epicurean Argument 
 
There is another sense in which the early portion of Wittgenstein’s ethical project 
can be said to adhere to a certain Epicurean moral principle. Observing his expressed 
sentiments towards death, safety, and fear presents good evidence that this particular 
strain of Wittgenstein’s ethical thought can be found throughout his early work; waxing 
in the period of the NB and TLP, and waning or evolving in the LoE and beyond. Though 
there is some fluctuation in how Wittgenstein sees such an Epicurean state as achievable, 
and indeed never refers to it explicitly as a part of that ancient school, the core idea 
remains: a good life, at least in part, can be found in the absence of the fear of and, 
ultimately, the thought of death.  
 An entry in the NB presents a good starting point for connecting the line through 
the early period of Wittgenstein’s work. Wittgenstein remarks that, “a man who is happy 
is a man who must have no fear. Not even in the face of death. Only a man who lives not 
in time but in the present is happy.” (NB, 8.7.16) This idea possess two chief 
components; one the psychological feeling of safety as the alleviation from omnipresent 
possibility of death, and the other an understanding of what it means to exist in an 
atemporal present. Both are equally important in the account of Wittgenstein’s ethical 
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project. They rely on one another, one an account of the psychology of fear, and the other 
acting as the metaphysical reasoning behind the former’s alleviation. Once again, the 
activity of philosophy provides access to a set of elucidations that, by clarifying the 
relation between the will and the world, lead to the realization of why the fear of death 
makes little sense. The persistence of such fear in the face of this understanding works as 
an example for what Wittgenstein imagines to be a poorly led life.  
 Following his remarks presented above, Wittgenstein returns to a sentiment often 
expressed in his work: somehow, living happily and living in agreement with the world 
are one and the same. Tucked into this same entry is a remarkable proposition, though it 
is certainly in line with what has come before. The philosopher states that, “the fear in the 
face of death is the best sign of a false, i.e. a bad, life.” (NB, 8.7.16) There are two senses 
in which this sort of fear may be taken. The expression fear in the face of death appears 
to make Wittgenstein into a critic of those who show cowardice in the face of what is 
obviously deadly. This may be a residual colloquialism from the events and time which 
enveloped him and the writing of the NB: combat on the Eastern Front of the First World 
War. With the immediacy of death more palpable here than in nearly any other situation, 
cowardice in the face of an enemy may be what he is getting at. It is, of course, difficult 
to accept this. There are many persons who never set foot on a battlefield or have so clear 
a cause of death as an enemy shell or bayonet. Yet, many of them go about in fear of 
death, though it may appear to be far off. The fear of death consumes most, even though 
many do not stare it in the face. 
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 The second way of looking at death must take into account Wittgenstein’s own 
ideas on causal determinism as shown prior. Again, facts in the world are completely 
subjected to the laws of causation and the list of natural and physical causes. Indeed, the 
philosopher remarks in the TLP that, “if everything we wished were to happen, this 
would only be, so to speak, a favor of fate...” (TLP, p. 104, Ogden, 2007) Things that 
happen outside of our immediate experience and expectations are equally subjected to the 
same rules as all other facts, yet we were just unaware of their causal processes. By 
adding this to the discussion of the fear of death, our ending is really just as possible on 
the field of battle as it is in a field of flowers. The imminence of death is ubiquitous, its 
face seen in many places. The fear of death is, then, really a constant state and 
preoccupation. This is why, for Wittgenstein, fear of death is most indicative of a bad 
life, because it is all-consuming and prevents happiness.  
The TLP picks up where the NB left off, though the text sticks to dissuading the 
reader of the fear of death by insisting that life and death be viewed atemporally rather 
than just as parts of a timeline. It is in 6.4311 that Wittgenstein makes his most explicit 
statement on the prospect of death: 
“Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through. If by eternity is understood 
not as endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the 
present. Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is without limit.” (TLP, 6.4311) 
By reasoning that death is, in fact, not a part of the chain of causation, but some 
other limit of the world, death will never be a part of one’s experience. A death removed 
from the realm of facts is not an end as the end of any other process in the world. By 
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elucidating the true character of death and its place, Wittgenstein is dispelling its most 
fearful quality. One will never experience death, so why fear it? Should someone be so 
preoccupied with the thought of death that they are prevented from living in the 
atemporal present, they are undermining what it means to live. 
Wittgenstein adopts the feeling of safety as important in further elucidating ethics 
once again in LOE. In characterizing the psychological state of feeling of absolutely5 
safe, he means “the state of mind in which one is inclined to say ‘I am safe, nothing can 
injure me whatever happens.’” (LOE, p.8, 1965) As this proposition appears couched in 
some grounds of the ethical absolute, Wittgenstein proposes what appeared so easy to 
conceptualize before in the TLP and NB is a statement of nonsense. He explicitly states, 
“to be safe essentially means that it is physically impossible that certain things should 
happen to me and therefore it is nonsense to say that I am safe whatever happens.” (LOE, 
p.9, 1965) The all-encompassing sense of safety, beyond the utilitarian or immediate 
sense, serves as just another version of ethical propositions beyond senseful speech. 
Wittgenstein’s ideas of fear and safety seem to have been thrown in flux, or at least called 
into question. 
 The facts of Wittgenstein’s life create an interesting juxtaposition when compared 
with his philosophy of life. As David Wiggins describes in his essay, “Wittgenstein on 
Ethics and the Riddle of Life” (2004), the text explicitly concerning the philosopher’s 
system of ethics in TLP “embody in a manner that is frighteningly exact the aspirations 




However, he notes the historically well known fact that Wittgenstein’s own life seldom, 
if ever, fully actualized the goal that he sets out for his readers. The elusive states of the 
safety and peace that haunts the closing of the TLP prove elusive for anyone who did not 
already find themselves in such a state.6  
 The evolution of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the fear of death reveals a, if not of 
consistent strength, line through his ethical project. It may be that, while the absolute 
feeling of safety he describes in the LOE is finally classified as nonsense, the importance 
of freeing oneself of fear always remains as an important and central part of his early 
philosophy. Though it may ultimately be nonsense, a state free of fear is necessary for a 
good life. 
III.III Final Remarks 
 
 I have not tried to argue that Wittgenstein was purely an Epicurean or that he truly 
was a thoroughgoing moral realist (though I believe the latter to be true to a certain 
extent). To be sure, his thought does adhere cleanly to the conceptions of moral realism 
that exist in metaethics today. The two explorations above have only existed to show that 
these strands are present throughout the early work. There are surely more to be 
elaborated upon.  
Part IV Counters to the Interpretation 
 
 Much of the analysis above, particularly in Parts I and II of this paper, has been 





interpretation. Over the last few decades this analysis has emerged as a major part of 
Wittgenstein literature. I here present two views that are opposed to those given above in 
an attempt to create a more holistic view of Wittgenstein’s ethical thought and ideas on 
philosophy. 
IV.I. Jaakko Hintikka and Wittgenstein’s Inexpressible 
  
 “Perhaps the entire Tractatus has to be understood,” states Jaakko Hintikka in his 
essay, “What Does the Wittgensteinian Inexpressible Express” (2003), “as a series of 
elucidations that ultimately serve to insinuate to a receptive reader certain metaphysical 
and ethical insights.” (Jaakko Hintikka, 2003, pp. 9) This view is the one which Hintikka 
takes to be that of the New Wittgensteinians, and it is largely the one expressed in the 
preceding sections. He claims that the problem with the view, simply put, is both 
“historical and systematic.” (Hintikka, 2003, pp.10) 
 At the core of Hintikka’s argument is the reasoning that the New 
Wittgensteineans do not take the philosopher’s statements literally enough, or at the very 
least they interpolate certain positions into the text beyond its face-value reading. A 
reading of the TLP that insists the passages of nonsense in fact mean something else is 
“naïve, not to say simple-minded.” (Hintikka, pp.10) Hintikka, contrariwise, insists that 
the book be held to the standard it sets for itself regarding nonsense. The New 
Wittgensteineans are, in interpreting the book in their manner, exceeding the bounds of a 
truly austere reading. They are attempting to “introduce a metaphysical vision through 
the back door of ‘showing.’ (Hintikka, pp. 10) By Hintikka’s account, this directly 
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transgresses the limits put forward by Wittgenstein both within the text and in his 
correspondence after its publication. 
 Hintikka continues by stating that the philosopher also excludes from the realm of 
sense propositions about the meaning of language, or “all propositions about how our 
language is related to the world and the logical relations based on these…” (Hintikka, 
2005 pp.10) This view lines up with the bookends of the TLP as well, in an even more 
literal way than the reading of the New Wittgensteineans. Yet, rather insisting that the 
text puts forward something other than the explicit theories within, the literal reading 
takes Wittgenstein to assume “that semantics is–literally-inexpressible.” (Hintikka, 2005 
pp.11) Hintikka sees Wittgenstein as adhering only to the ideas of logical semantics 
expressed in the text, and not attempting to show something in a more indirect way.  
 Based on the Wittgenstein’s historical position, Hintikka suggests that it is likely 
the philosopher is expressing some form of ineffability doctrine regarding semantics. 
Rather than argue that this is a result of Wittgenstein’s mysticism, Hintikka argues that 
adherence to this doctrine “opened the possibility for a certain kind of mystical stance.” 
(Hintikka, 2003, pp.12) What sets Wittgenstein apart from others who may entertain the 
ineffability of semantics, is that it he has the “temerity to raise the question of the 
impressibility of the entire enterprise.” (Hintikka, 2003, pp.12) Not to be taken as a 
mystic, Wittgenstein is only mounting the same thorough analysis as he does throughout 
the text. This, once again, accounts for a historical situation that Hintikka accuses the 
New Wittgensteineans of misreading.  
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 Hintikka’s final accusation rests on the interpretation of the New 
Wittgensteineans that ethics is shown in some backdoor or philosophically duplicitous 
manner throughout the text. He admits that the aspects of the “unsayable [is] connected 
with [Wittgenstein’s] ethical stance.” (Hintikka, 2003, pp.16) The ethics the text 
expounds on Hintikka’s account, however, is very different than that from the New 
Wittgensteineans. For the philosopher, “the test case for ethical authenticity was the 
authenticity of language.” (Hintikka, 2003, pp.16) The honesty of speech and 
communication are also derived from the limits of what can be expressed. Hintikka 
claims that Wittgenstein shares a “faithful, presuppositionless representation of reality” 
(Hintikka, 2003, pp.17) with many of the writers and artists that he admired. Ethics 
becomes one with the limits of the capabilities of speech, and adhering to those limits is 
the mark of ethical discourse.  
IV.II Hacker and Wittgenstein’s Whistle 
 Peter Hacker directly confronts the interpretation given by Diamond mentioned in 
the above account of the TLP in his essay, “Was He Trying to Whistle It? (2000)”. Like 
Hintikka, he finds fault with the New Wittgensteinean claim of possessing a more 
resolute, serious, or literal interpretation of the text. Her adherence to understanding the 
frame of the text is where Diamond, on this account, goes awry.  
 Hacker points out Diamond’s view that the purpose of the book is to present a 
certain set of nonsensical propositions that, once they are used to climb the ladder, may 
be done away with and shown to be only nonsense. There are no ineffable truths towards 
which Wittgenstein is attempting to point, only these aspects of nonsense. The frame of 
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the book, in Hacker’s account of Diamond, is “meant to indicate that the temptation to 
think that there are any such truths is no more than an illusion, that beyond the limits of 
language lie not ineffable truths, but plain nonsense. (Hacker, Was He Trying to Whistle 
It?, 2000, The New Wittgenstein, pp.370) 
If one sticks to the frame, then they miss certain dissenting passages in the text 
that must be read just as seriously. Hacker insists that, if one actually accepts the entirety 
of Wittgenstein’s project, they realize that “the innovation of the Tractatus was to argue 
that the necessary truths of logic are senseless, and that all other purativley necessary 
truths cannot be said, but only shown.” (Hacker, pp.370) The belief that the entirety of 
the text maintains the same Zen-like7 status as the frame ignores Wittgenstein’s explicit 
assertion that “There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.” 
(TLP, 6.522)  
Hacker’s view acts as a counter to Diamond’s claim that, once the ladder is tossed 
away, there is no more need for nonsense and the world is seen rightly. Rather, he 
provides direct evidence, much like Hintikka, to show that Wittgenstein is indeed a part 
of an ineffablist tradition. There is something which shows through from nonsense, and 
nonsense is more substantive or important than what Diamond takes it to be.  
IV.III Final Remarks 
 
 I have provided two views that detract from the New Wittgensteinean reading of 
the early portions of Wittgenstein’s work. These views, I do not think, are completely 
incompatible with the views expressed in Part III of this work and may indeed offer 
																																																						
7 Hacker, 2003, pp.370 
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support to the the realist argument. However, they do present a challenge to the views on 
philosophy expressed in Part II, as well as the interpretation of the frame of the TLP in 
Part I. It is interesting to note how each claims to be more austere, resolute, or serious 
regarding the text. Both offer particular takes on Wittgenstein, beyond difference in 
exegetical prowess.  
 The tension, particularly between Hacker and Diamond, is clearly seen in the the 
accusations of “Zen-like” from the former and “Mysticism” from the latter. The account 
of the purpose of nonsense, then, is where the accusations form. It either ends with 
nonsense, which is then tossed aside having reached its end, or there is something to 
nonsense which is indispensable. One is either a Zen-master or a mystic, if we adhere to a 
dichotomy as strict as this.  
Conclusion 
  
 This exploration represents a distinct set of views on Wittgenstein’s ethical 
project and his thoughts on the activity of philosophy. There is obviously much more that 
needs been said to form the complete picture. However, the above provides certain 
necessary building blocks that must be accounted for should any attempt at further study 
of this area of Wittgenstein’s thought be made. 
 The closing of Spinoza’s ethics evokes the same sentiment as the end of the TLP, 
and it may provide an insight in reflecting on the closure of Wittgenstein’s ethical project 
in his early period. “I have now completed all that I intend to demonstrate concerning the 
power of the mind over the emotions and concerning the freedom of the mind,” Spinoza 
states: 
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“… the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, suffers scarcely any 
disturbance of spirit, but being conscious, by virtue of a certain eternal 
necessity, of himself, of God and of things, never ceases to be, but always 
possesses true spiritual contentment.” (Spinoza, Ethics, trans, Shirley, 
2006, pp. 161) 
 
 Wittgenstein claims that, at the end of the TLP, one sees the world rightly. This is 
much more than a claim of having grabbed the correct metaphysics. It shows that, when 
we see through the confusion of thought and language and realize the limits of our 
abilities, we reach a kind of contentment and an understanding of the world. It is a certain 
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